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other than the person specified by the controlling regulations. Recently an Ohio court
held that the act of Congress authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to issue
United States Savings Bonds and authorizing the Treasury Department to prescribe
regulations for the payment of said bonds takes precedence over the state laws of
succession. Lanfersweiler v. Richmond, Prob. Ct., 8 Ohio Supp. 76 (1942). Other
courts have taken a like position. In Re Stanley's Estate, 102 Colo. 422, 80 P. (2d)
332 (1938); Franklin Washington Trust Co. v. Beltram, 133 N. J. Eq. 11, 29 A.
(2d) 854 (1943); United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 50 Fed. Supli. 73
(1943). The power of a State to regulate the devolution of property is unquestioned,
and the courts have never hesitated to uphold the State's right where exercised
within Constitutional limitations. Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U. S. 95 (1942). But
under the clause of the Constitution providing that acts of Congress shall be the
supreme law of the land, no State law can vary the terms of Federal obligations
or derogate from their full enforceability. Art. VI, Cl. 2.
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THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HoL Es. Edited by Max Lerner. Boston: Little,
Brown and Company. 1943. Pp. L, 474. $4.00.
Max Lerner introduces this Holmes anthology with a brilliant thirty-page "Per-
sonal History" of the famous Justice. The introductory essay in careful swift-
moving prose outlines the life story and evaluates the place of Holmes in the
contemporary scene. For it becomes increasingly apparent as the Holmes literature
comes from the presses month after month that his influence plays an important
part in that scene. Mr. Lemer's portrayal, though written from the standpoint
of a devout admirer, escapes (by a little) inclusion in the fulsome adulation which
characterizes the utterances of some of the worshippers at the Holmes shrine. For
both in the introductory essay and in the extended interpretative comments which
preface the selections that compose the anthology Mr. Lerner's attitude is that of
the critic who is evaluating Holmes' genius, and who in spite of very general agree-
ment finds his hero wanting now and then.
It is almost a mistake to call this work an anthology. I incline to feel that in
writing it Mr. Lemer must have hesitated at times whether to write a book about
Holmes or to let Holmes speak his own piece. For the introductory comments
are sometimes much longer than the selections they introduce-with the result
that the book gives us not only a fair idea of Holmes, and of what Mr. Lerner
thinks about Holmes, but also, naturally enough, more than an inkling of Mr. Lerner's
own mind on some of the larger problems of government, economics, civil liberties,
etc. In Holmes' prefatory essay to an edition of Montesquieu's, Spirit of the Laws
he writes: "It would be out of place to offer an analysis of a book which is before
the reader . . .", which may explain why Mr. Lerner finds the essay lacking in
political depth.2 'Holmes restricted himself, to other works of Montesquieu. Mr.
1. P. 381.
2. P. 369.
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Lerner decided on the other course, and gives us the sum and substance of the
selections he is about to reproduce, colored by his own thinking, in a way that at
times makes the reading of Holmes himself seem repetitious. But let not the reader
complain of that. Mr. Lerner has warned him: "Those who prefer their own paths
will, in any event, know well enough how to ignore my notes."83 My only fear is
that many who read the book will be men who have read most of these decisions
and essays long since, and feeling that their vague memory of them constitutes a
sufficient acquaintance, will be content to skip Holmes' and read Mr. Lerner. I say
"I fear" this, not because Mr. Lerner has failed to write valuably and searchingly
about Holmes, but because I think his own principal intent is to give us "Holmes
himself", not "Holmes through Lerner's eyes"--whether that vision be perfect or
imperfect.
The book contains about 500 large pages and divides the Holmes selections into
three parts:
I. "Campaigns of Life and Law", which contains many of the speeches, some
important book reviews or case-notes, parts of The Common Law, and nine opinions
of Holmes written when he sat on the Massachusetts bench.
II. "Supreme Court Justice", contains a large selection of decisions and dissents
"fired off" by Holmes as a Justice of the Supreme Tribunal of the United States.
This part has two sections: 1. America as a Going Concern-a, title with an economic
flavor which aptly describes the general content of the decisions here set forth.
They deal to a large extent with economic issues involved in the relationship between
government power and the regulation of business. 2. State Power and Free Trade
in Ideas, continuing the economic analogy, gives us the free speech cases and other
civil liberties decisions or dissents.
III. "The Savor of Life" contains more of the essays, including the famous
controversial ones on Ideals and Doubts and Natuaral Law, letters to James, Wu, the
Pollocks, and a few "Last Words." An exhaustive bibliography is not attempted,
but there is a full and helpful, Note on the Holmes Literature, a Table of Cases,
and an Index.
I said that Mr. Lerner dissents from Holmes here and there. A great many of
the cases he chooses deal with economic issues, and usually he agrees with Holmes
whether the latter agrees with the Court or not. Occasionally, as in the Northern
Securities case, he feels that Holmes did not go far enough in allowing the govern-
ment to exercise its'control over capitalistic trends. I am not sufficiently familiar
with Holmes' entire Supreme Court output to say whether the number of "social-
economic" cases included is disproportionate, but Mr. Lerner's point of view seems
to be largely inclined toward an economic interpretation of the phenomena of
government.
With regard to free speech, on the other hand, Mr. Lerner seems to think that
Holmes went too far. Or' perhaps it would be more accurate to say that he con-
siders the "clear and present danger" test too liberal for our present circumstances.
He speaks of the "obscene scribblings of Coughlin and Pelley or the divisionist
articles in the Chicago Tribune which represent the danger in the time of the Nazi
thrust for world empire". 4 He apparently would favor putting all these out of
3. P. ix.
4. P. xiv.
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business, for he says: "... it is becoming increasingly clear that the government
which waits until propaganda has reached the point of clearly threatening the
immediate survival of the nation is likely to wait until it is too late, and will probably
never have the strength to strike when the time comes."5 He thinks that Holmes'
economic analogy ("free trade in ideas") "... probably assumes too much. For
one thing, is it ever possible actually to achieve, free trade in ideas? It is far more
likely that what We have in the intellectual sphere, as in the economic sphere, is
not a competitive system but something that the economists call 'imperfect com-
petition'. And assuming that one can get a situation roughly approximating the
competition of ideas, the question is raised, here as in economics whether that is
possible without drastic government intervention in order to establish the conditions
of competitio".G Mr. Lerner would undoubtedly answer the question in favor of
drastic government intervention-a solution which fails to take into account that the
government is the principal competitor and might conceivably (as in Russia, Ger-
many) "establish the conditions" in favor of itself.
This tendency to recognize more and more power in the government to control
even the speech and publications of its citizens is not entirely foreign to Holmes'
mind, as Mr. Lerner shows. "What Holmes is saying in effect is that free speech
is not an absolute value, to be guaranteed under evenr circumstance and at any
social cost".7 On the other hand he twice quotes approvingly Holmes' statement
in the Gitlow case: "If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian
dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces in the community,
the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have
their way." 8 I do not mean to imply here that Mr. Lerner (any more than Holmes
himself) is approving of proletarian dictatorslip. But he seems to adopt the position
that free speech is so sacred that we must not interfere with it even if it ends in
proletarian dictatorship, but it is not so sacred that it has to be protected when it
might in the long run end in Nazism.
The two points of view are not entirely irreconcilable. I do not know how Mr.
Lerner would reconcile them. But Roger Baldwin, a national executive head of
the American Civil Liberties Union, reconciled them as follows, writing in Soviet
Russia Today:0 "Those of us who champion civil liberties in the United States and
at the same time support the proletarian dictatorship of the Soviet Union are
charged with inconsistency and insincerity. . . . Everybody takes a class posi-
tion . . . consciously or unconsciously. . . . I too take a class position. It is anti-
capitalist and pro-revolutionary. I believe in non-violent methods of struggle as
most effective in the long run for building Up successful working class power.
Where they cannot be followed . . . only violent tactics remain. I champion civil
liberty as the best of the non-violent means of building the power on which workers'
rule must be based., If I aid the reactionaries to get free speech now and then, if
I go outside the class struggle to fight against censorship, it is only because those
liberties help to create a more hospitable atmosphere for working class liberties. The
5. P. 316.
6. P. 290-291: Italics added.
7. P. 293.
8. Pp. xliv, 323.
9. Soviet Russia Today, Sept. 1934.
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class struggle is the central struggle in the world; all others are incidental. When
the power of the working class is once achieved as it has been only in the Soviet
Union I am for maintaining it by any means whatsoever. Dictatorship is the obvious
means in a world of enemies at home and abroad."' 0
The liberal Holmes could never conceivably have stultified his liberalism by saying
anything like that, one obvious reason being that for him the class struggle was not
the higher absolute in which all conflicts are resolved. Besides, as a judge, he
worked honestly within the firamework of the Constitution. But there is nothing
in Holmes' fundamental philosophy of government, no principle, no absolute, with
which he could gainsay Baldwin. What Mr. Lerner's higher absolute would be it is
hard to say. He agrees with Mr. Frankfurter's principle in the Gobitis decision,
though not with the decision itself." Religious liberty is not the higher absolute.
Very likely he would accept Holmes' view that "public policy" is the ultimate
principle. Public policy is another name for state power. He speaks of democracy
as the thing we are fighting for, but I do not find any dissent from Holmes' idea
that "what the crowd wants" is the touchstone of democracy. Incidentally, as to
government power Mr. Lerner notes a trend not only to concentration of power in
Washington but in the hands of the President himself.1
2
A re-reading of the Holmes essays and other selections in this book confirms a
view I have expressed elsewhere, that in his fundamental philosophy of law Holmes
was a materialistic, atheistic devotee of public policy, and that this philosophy, when
analyzed, adds up to a crude form of totalitarianism in which might makes right.
Holmes defined the law, Mr. Lemer tells us, as "the prophecies of what the courts
will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious", and he goes on: "On this suggestion,
dropped almost casually in 1897, was built the school of American legal 'realism'
which is our characteristic contribution to legal thought."' 3  But Mr. Lerner recog-
nizes elsewhere that this view of the law was at the bottom of Holmes' legal
philosophy.14 In his preface to Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws, Holmes says,
speaking of government: "What proximate test of excellence can be found except
correspondence to the actual equilibrium of force in the community-that is, con-
formity to the wishes of the dominant power? Of course, such conformity may
lead to destruction, and it is desirable that the dominant power should be wise.
But wise or not, the proximate test of a good government is that the dominant
power has its way."'.5
I do not find anything in Mr. Lerer's comments to indicate that he disagrees
with the fundamental force philosophy of Holmes. "Today more than ever we stand
in need of Holmes the good soldier, Holmes the partisan of civil liberties, Holmes
who was skeptical of the omniscience of any elite, yet Holmes who for all his
skepticism rested "fnally on a fighting faith.' 6  This "fighting faith" in the last
10. REP. SpEc. Coi-. To INVEsTIGAT . .. SUBVERsrV ORGANIZATIONS (Mass. Legisla-
ture, 1938) 56.
11. P. 320n.
12. P. 286.
13. P. 368.
14. Cf. pp. 190-191, 197, 47, 372-373.
15. P. 378.
16. P. ix. Italics added.
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analysis reduces itself to a blind surrender to an innate prejudice or desire, and the
expression of that desire by force. The book is inscribed to Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
who has made known his disagreement with the view that for Holmes force was
the ultima ratio-though Holmes himself said it was, more than once. Under the
inscription to Mr. Frankfurter stands a quotation, nevertheless, which aptly epi-
tomizes Holmes' force philosophy. "The final test ... is battle in some form ...
It is one thing to utter a happy phrase from a protected cloister; another to think
under fire-to think for action upon which great interests depend." Apropos of
Mr. Frankfurter the quotation merely has reference, I suppose to the fact that he
is engaged in the active rather than the contemplative life at the moment. But
Holmes, when he used the phrase, was talking of human energy, with the emphasis
on the material and the physical. ". . . I know of no true measure of men except
the total of human energy which they embody-counting everything, with due
allowance for quality, from Nansen's power to digest blubber or to resist cold, up
to his courage, or to Wordsworth's power to express the unutterable, or to Kent's
speculative reach. The final test of this energy is battle in some form-actual war-
the crush of Arctic ice-the fight for mastery in the market or the court." 17
Mr. Lerner's work shows deep scholarship, a thorough acquaintance with the
Holmes literature, and is valuable as collecting in one place all the more important
of Holmes' productions. But its principal value to the present writer consists in
this: it is one more proof that there exists in this country a powerful ideological
trend which is materialistic, atheistic, and which in its neglect of spiritual values
and human dignity and exaggeration of "dominant force" can lead us to the absolute
state.
JOHN C. FoRD, S.J.t
LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION. By Fred E. Inbau. Baltimore: The
Williams and Wilkins Company. 1942. Pp. vii, 142. $3.00.
It is especially fitting that this book be reviewed in a Fordham publication from a
school where Father Summers had pioneered in the usage of the galvanometer in
criminal investigation. Unfortunately space does not permit an exposition of the
inaccuracies and inconsistencies of this book. The glaring mistakes and the lack of
familiarity with basic physio-psychological and pathological principles involved can
be understood when we remember that the author is primarily trained in law and has
no degrees either in physiology, medicine or psychology. Trainifig in these fundamental
disciplines is necessary for a proper research program in this controversial field. The
operation of physiological apparatus has too often been exploited by lawyers, police-
men, business men and investigators. A graduate lawyer, the author assisted Keeler
for some years and in this manner became familiar with methods introduced years
before by pioneers, physiologists and psychologists antedating Keeler. Inbau then
went to the Chicago Police Department, taking over the Northwestern University
Laboratory which had been purchased by the police department.
17. P. 39.
t Professor of Moral Theology, Weston College, Weston, Massachusetts.
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Although the author stresses that the fundamental disciplines involved in the so-
called "Lie-Detector" are physiology and psychology, the reviewer is familiar with no
experimental studies published by him in these disciplines. Yet in a critical and arbi-
trary fashion he disposes of the work of Father Summers, a professor of psychology
and formerly a professor of physiology in the Georgetown Medical School. He repu-
diates the physiological, psychological and medical workers; he shows pages of charts
with involved, inaccurate interpretations and then presents garbled formulations in
an attempt to explain a technique which is incorrect as described. He is apparently
unfamiliar with the scientific literature, or he deliberately ignores key contributions
which have scientific priority and arbitrarily assigns credit at will. Although he rejects
the disciplines involved stating that the workers in this field are not interested, it was
Miinsterberg, Marston, Burt, Larson, Summers, Lyons, Canty, Kubis and others who
have made and are making the constructive as well as the pioneering experiments.
The procedures of hundreds of untrained operators are stimulated and encouraged
by the present book. The author wrote: "Anyone who seeks to detect deception by
this technique should have a fair understanding of psychology and physiology and
preferably an extensive knowledge of each, but it is not necessary that he be either
a physician or an expert psychologist. In any event, however, it is essential that before
attempting to conduct his own independent examinations in actual cases he should
have'had considerable experience in the use of the technique, either as a result of
extensive experimentation and study, if working alone and unassisted, or else as a
consequence of an extended period of instruction from a qualified examiner." I This
has in no wise been the case as some of the foremost polygraph operators started out
on their own without having conducted a test or after having had only two weeks
training.
Again he wrote: "As previously stated, even when the best available instrument
and methods are employed by skilled and competent examiners there is a margin of
probable error of approximately ten per cent. There is also an additional group of
cases, approximately twenty per cent, in which the test records are too indefinite in
their indications to permit a diagnosis; and it is usually with this group that the less
competent exaniiners make their higher percentage of error, because of a failure to
exercise the degree of caution deemed advisable by experienced and trained examiners.
This leaves at best an estimated accuracy of seventy per cent. ' 2 Yet in none of the
author's previous publications that the reviewer knows of has he published any scien-
tific protocols showing where he gets his claims, of statistical error or accuracy. The
reviewer in some of his own work has found errors of interpretation even as high as
fifty per cent.
To quote again "The present lie-detector technique is not adequately standardized
either as to instrumentation, or the manner in which the tests should be conducted,
or the interpretations of the recordings, therefore, the courts would be unable to
properly determine whether or not the results of some particular test should be
admitted in evidence."-3 Later, he says: "Unfortunately, however, the two professions
[i.e. psychology and physiology] by and large have not been sufficiently interested
1. P. 58.
2. P. 62.
3. P. 63.
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to investigate the possibilities of the technique or to conduct their own independent
research and experiments (except perhaps as regards class room demonstrations);
and for this reason they are actually not prepared to offer an. authoritative opinion
upon the subject. In any event, and despite whatever the reasons might.be, the lie-
detector technique at the present time lacks not only the legally essential acceptance
by psychologists and physiologists but also their active interest in the potentialities
of the technique." 4
The reviewer must disagree with the above excerpts, as it was the physiologists and
psychologists who made the pioneer contributions in this country and whose methods
-were published in the scientific literature long before the formation of any Scientific
Crime Detection Laboratories. Aside from the type of recorders, the techniques used
for years by Keeler, Inbau and other operators were not essentially different in prin-
ciple from those introduced into police procedure by Larson alone in 1921. Although
the reviewer has publicly insisted that the operators must have recognized status, the
majority of operators are either police or private investigators or lawyers with no
recognized graduate status in -the disciplines involved. Because of this lack of basic
training these operators have oversold the field, exploited machines, even made clinical
diagnoses of the records. This of course is neither possible nor have their findings
been confirmed by psychiatric workers. Serious investigators would question such
diagnoses by non-clinical operators and it is because of the latter that deception tech-
niques have not had a better scientific reputation. All students of law interested in
these questions should consult the summary of the medico-legal symposium of Wayne
County, Michigan (1938) presented in the Journal of the Michigan State Medical
Society.
Although repudiating medical and psychiatric training the author does not hesitate
to make all sorts of diagnostic statements and conclusions and "practically states that
the operator not formally trained in these fields can rule out medical and mental
pathology by an inspection of the suspects or their recbrds. To bolster his statement
that intensive training in these fields is not essential he cites the opinion of a prominent
medico-legal consultant for a police department where a Keeler trained operator did
most of the test work. However, this opinion was taken from an editorial survey of
a medico-legal journal and apparently was based upon no experimental protocols
published in the basic sciences. In the opinion of the reviewer the material as pre-
sented can only do positive damage by encouraging the work of operators without
authorized basic training in the fundamental disciplines. It was such problems of
training that were foremost in the mind of Dean Seashore of the Iowa Graduate
School when he asked Larson to train graduate students' of psychology in this pro-
cedure. Unfortunately this could not be done at that time.
The reviewer will not discuss in detail the second part of this book which he does
not feel is a new or dignified contribution as contrasted with such writers as Osborn
or Wellman and for the police field from Berkely, California, the work of Kidd. The
reviewer doubts if the experienced jurist or prosecutor would publicly accept such
techniques as: ". . . sympathizing with the subject in condemning his victim, etc.
4. P. 65.
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." ;5 "utilization of trick and deception .. ,,1;6 "the friend and enemy act . .Y ,;7
"reduce a subject's guilt feelings by minimizing the moral seriousness of his of-
fense. ... 8
JOHN A. LARSON, PH.D., M.D.±
THE GROWTH OF AmERiCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. By Benjamin F. Wright. Bos-
ton: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1942. Pp. viii, 276. $2.25.
Professor Wright has written this book-for the purpose of tracing the institution
of'judicial review in American constitutional law. He considers this power of judicial
review "our most characteristic political institution" and more distinctly American
than any other innovation of our dual form of government. Having this limited, but
important, phase of constitutional history as his single objective, he freely concedes
that his treatise does not purport to deal with the entire body of constitutional law,
but only with that part which is related to the stated doctrine of judicial review-the
"veto" power which permits the courts to declare statutes, both federal and state
unconstitutional.
His book follows the promise inherent in his title; he develops the growth of
judicial review from its early beginnings to the present day and points out that the
American doctrine of judicial supremacy did not originate in the Federal Convention
of 1787. It owes its origin to the then current belief in a "higher law" and in "funda-
mental principles superior to man-made rules."' This theory of natural law was
accepted by our forefathers, found its way into the Declaration of Independence -
and provided a suitable base for the contention that legislatures must conform to the
dictates of a higher law. But what department of government should be given the
right to have the final word in the shaping of law? Congress, President or Court?
It was Marshall, the "superb strategist", who wrote the doctrine of judicial review
indelibly into American constitutional law in Marbury v. Madison. "It is a theory
of the judges as the only true guardians of the permanent will of the people which
is incorporated in the Constitution. The assumption throughout is that the Congress
and President cannot be trusted to interpret that will."13
Professor Wright points out that the doctrine of judicial review, firmly established
during the Marshall era, was continued and strengthened by'the Jacksonian judges4
5. P. 87.
6. P. 127.
7. P. 92.
8. P. 85.
t Director of Insulin and Electric Shock Therapy, The Long Island Home, Amityville,
New York.
1. P. 9.
.2. Wright points out that the framers of the Declaration of Independence "placed their
sole reliance upon .the 'Laws of Nature and Nature's God.'" P. 11.
3. P. 37.
4. Ch. IV.
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and has continued without abatement down to our own day.5 He devotes considerable
attention to the last decade in his chapter entitled "The New Deal and the Old
Supreme Court" G and proves that the solidification of judicial power was ,evidenced
in the early days of the' New Deal. "Between January 7, 1935, and May 25, 1936,
the Supreme Court handed down twelve decisions in which Congressional statutes
were held to be unconstitutional. ' 7 The result of the excessive judicial nullification
of legislative acts, he contends, was the Roosevelt court plan, a proposal which had
few merits except that it centered attention about the standpattism of the old Court,
Wright argues that the Roosevelt plan brought about "the switch in time"-a reversal
by the Supreme Court which resulted in the validation of the minimum wage statute
in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,8 the National Labor Relations Act and-similar
legislative experiments. 9
After completing his history of judicial review from 1787 to 1942, Professor Wright
attempts an appraisal of the doctrine. He c6ncludes that judicial review has estab-
lished .itself down the years and that as a result of the doctrine, the Constitution is
healthier today than it has been for the past 50 years. This doctrine permits the
court to meet economic and social changes within the broad principles of the Con-
stitution. It allows the court to act as a "federal umpire"; it provides for a merger
of the principles of stability and growth.
Professor Wright's book is interestingly written and well documented and is an
able defense of the institution of judicial review which has played an important part
in the growth of the American nation.
WALTER B. KENNEDYt
5. Ch. V, VI, VII.
6. Ch. IX.
7. P. 180.
S. 300 U. S. 379 (1937).
9. Pp. 203-207.
t Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.

